Personal

STEPHEN JAY GOULD teaches biology, geology and the history of science at Harvard University, where he has been on the faculty since 1967. He received an A.B. from Antioch College and a PhD. in paleontology from Columbia University. Well known for his popular scientific writings, in particular his monthly column in Natural History magazine, he is the author of 13 books.
Some creators announce their inventions with grand éclat. God proclaimed, "Fiat lux," and then flooded his new universe with brightness. Others bring forth great discoveries in a modest guise, as did Charles Darwin in defining his new mechanism of evolutionary causality in 1859: "I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection."

Charles Darwin did not come up with the idea of evolution, he was merely the first to come up with an explanation for how evolution worked that explained what he and other biologists saw in the world. Darwin came up with the idea of Natural Selection. This is the idea that the environment an organism lives in helps to determine which organisms survive and produce young, and which do not.

AMERICA, 1847: a highly competent and, by all accounts, pleasant manual laborer of Irish extraction named Phineas Gage is involved in rock blasting operations in mountainous terrain. In the course of one sadly uncontrolled explosion, an iron bar is picked up by the force of the blast and driven clean through the front part of his head. Phineas is sent flying, but, to everybody's surprise, he survives the removal of the protruding bar. As he recovers, however, it is observed that his personality has dramatically changed, though his memory and intelligence remain apparently unaffected. In 1868, a physician named Harlow from Boston writes about him: "His equilibrium, or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculties and animal propensities seems to have been destroyed. He is fitful, irreverent, indulging in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires." The now extremely rude Phineas Gage is an object of immense medical interest, for it seems clear, from his somewhat crude experience of psychosurgery, that one can alter the social behavior of the human animal by physically interfering with the frontal lobes of the brain.

Edward O. Wilson is the founder of Sociobiology and is widely regarded to be the world's most famous living scientist. Recently, Wilson seized the word "consilience" from deep within the history of science and reintroduced it into our language by emblazoning it across the cover of his latest best-seller, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. In this book, Wilson offers to unify the "two cultures" of literature and science for once and forever, as "the way to renew the crumbling structure of the liberal arts" (12). It is an offer many of my colleagues find attractive, for Wilson carries enormous authority both as a natural scientist and as an eloquent speaker for the environmentally appealing concepts of "biophilia" and "biodiversity." He has well-nigh captured the Thoreau Society: for example, in June 1998 he joined Bill and Hillary Clinton as a featured guest at the opening of the Thoreau Institute, delivering a brief address which has been reprinted as the Preface to the Thoreau Society's collection of Thoreau's writings on science, which I edited and entitled Material Faith.

Stephen William Hawking was born on 8 January 1942 (300 years after the death of Galileo) in Oxford, England. His parents' house was in north London, but during the second world war Oxford was considered a safer place to have babies. When he was eight, his family moved to St Albans, a town about 20 miles north of London. At eleven Stephen went to St Albans School, and then on to University College, Oxford, his father's old college. Stephen wanted to do Mathematics, although his father would have preferred medicine. Mathematics was not available at University College, so he did Physics instead. After three years and not very much work he was awarded a first class honours degree in Natural Science.

This site is dedicated to locating and reporting traces of the history of psychology throughout Europe. It is an outgrowth of several recent trips to Europe, during which I visited sites both well known and obscure. It occurred to me that an index to historical artifacts of psychology could enrich a visit to Europe, and help interested people locate some of the roots of our discipline.

This is an e-text about the historical and philosophical background of Psychology. It was originally written for the benefit of my students at Shippensburg University, but I hope that it helps anyone with an intellectual interest in the field. The material is original and copyrighted by myself, and any distribution must be accompanied by my name and the copyright information. For personal educational use, it is free to one and all.

Galton and subsequent investigators find wide divergences in people's subjective reports of mental imagery. Such individual differences might be taken to explain the peculiarly irreconcilable disputes over the nature and cognitive significance of imagery which have periodically broken out among psychologists and philosophers. However, to so explain these disputes is itself to take a substantive and questionable position on the cognitive role of imagery. This article distinguishes three separable issues over which people can be "for" or "against" mental images. Conflation of these issues can lead to theoretical differences being mistaken for experiential differences, even by theorists themselves. This is applied to the case of John B. Watson, who inaugurated a half-century of neglect of image psychology. Watson originally claimed to have vivid imagery; by 1913 he was denying the existence of images. This strange reversal, which made his behaviorism possible, is explicable as a "creative misconstrual" of Dunlap's "motor" theory of imagination.

While Müller ended his life as the experimentalist, he did not start out as one. His second doctoral subject was experimental physics (taught by Wilhelm Weber), but his dissertation of 1873 and his habilitation of 1876 (Müller, 1878a) would today be book-length versions of a Psychological Review articles, since there is no original data in either one. In the Habilitation, he defined much of the standard psychophysics that has been passed down to students (Haupt, 1995); recommended using both ascending and descending methods of limits to limit bias and the method of constant stimuli, which he extensively developed with the Müller weights, would seem to be another method designed to improve the usefulness of a threshold, but he did not provide any new experimental data. In the early papers on memory by Müller and Schumann, he seems to have originated a number of important procedural controls for the study of association. Kroh (1935, p. 155) puts Müller in the same group (first generation of psychologists) with Stumpf and Külpe, for which the transition to being an experimentalist was a significant step; a step that was not required for anyone trained as a physicist (Fechner) or physiologist (Wundt).

1650-1699
Descartes, Bishop Ussher, Hobbes, ... , Locke, Pepys, Perrault

1700-1749
Broughton, Leibniz, Berkeley, ... , La Mettrie, Hartley, Tillotson